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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants
I. INTRODUCTION
Joint tortfeasors traditionally have been held jointly and sever-
ally liable for a plaintiffs damages.' Thus, a plaintiff can choose to
bring suit against only one of several wrongdoers, or he can elect to
collect the full amount of a joint judgment from any one of several
defendants. The inherent inequity of this situation-requiring one
defendant to pay for all-is remedied by contribution, which re-
quires each tortfeasor to pay a proportionate share of the damages
to any other joint tortfeasor who has paid more than his fair share.2
The common law rule, however, generally disallowed contribution
among joint tortfeasors.3
Coviolators of the federal antitrust laws4 are tortfeasors and
thus are jointly and severally liable. 5 The antitrust laws, however,
do not provide expressly for contribution. Moreover, until recently,
i. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 47, at 296 (4th ed. 1971).
2. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 168 (D. Del. 1974), va-
cated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Leflar, Contribution And Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932). The basis of contribution is the equitable
notion that parties jointly responsible for harm should share the burden of liability. Ruder,
Multiple Defendants In Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 647 (1972).
A distinction should be made between contribution and indemnity because the two are
often confused. Contribution distributes the loss among tortfeasors by requiring each to pay
his proportionate share, whereas indemnity shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor to an-
other. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 51, at 310.
3. The American common law rule traditionally disallowed contribution among joint
tortfeasors-whether intentional or unintentional. Union Stock Yards v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217 (1905). The English common law rule denies contribution only to
intentional tortfeasors. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337
(1799). In Merryweather Lord Kenyon held that no right of contribution existed among joint
tortfeasors. At that time, however, torts were only intentional wrongs. Therefore, later cases
applied the rule to joint intentional wrongdoers. Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng.
Rep. 693 (1827). Although early American courts properly applied this rule, later courts mis-
interpreted Merryweather and disallowed contribution to both intentional and unintentional
tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at § 50, at 305-06. The harshness of the American
rule has been criticized by a number of commentators. W. PROSSER, id. § 50, at 307; Gregory,
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1170 (1941); Leflar,
supra note 2. A majority of states have thus either judicially or statutorily modified the rule.
See Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967); S. REP. No. 96-428, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1979).
4. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1976).
5. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957);
Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 792 (1944).
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courts have followed the common law rule and have uniformly de-
clined to imply a right of contribution among antitrust defendants.
This situation poses special problems for antitrust defendants be-
cause they are liable for treble the amount of plaintiff's damages.
Several unpleasant scenarios thus develop for an antitrust defen-
dant. Despite the presence of other wrongdoers, a plaintiff may
choose to sue only one defendant for all damages or to collect the
full amount of a treble damage judgment from one of several de-
fendants. Furthermore, as individual defendants settle, the total
potential liability of the remaining defendants increases propor-
tionately because only the actual settlement amount is deducted
from a treble damage award.
From the standpoint of the antitrust defendant, however, the
most unpleasant prospect is the recent trend toward staggering
damage awards. For example, estimates of the liability of the few
remaining defendants in the Corrugated Container Antitrust Liti-
gation ranges from 200 million to one billion dollars-before treb-
ling.8 The prospect of such huge damages has prompted reevalua-
tion of the traditional no contribution rule and judicial departure
from existing precedent.
Recently, the Eighth Circuit concluded that fundamental fair-
ness requires that "contribution be enforced among joint
tortfeasors in an antitrust action. ' 7 Subsequently, however, the
Fifth8 and Tenth9 Circuits considered the contribution issue, but
rejected the Eighth Circuit analysis, instead holding that no right
of contribution exists among antitrust defendants."0 The purposes
of this Recent Development are to analyze these recent judicial de-
velopments in light of existing precedent and to make recommen-
dations concerning the future of contribution in antitrust law. This
Recent Development argues that no single federal common law rule
of contribution exists and that federal securities law decisions pro-
vide the best analogy from which to imply a right of contribution
under the antitrust laws. Thus, the Recent Development proposes
6. In Re Corrugated Container Litigation, No. 310 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 1979), reprinted
in 919 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1, petition for cert. filed sub nom. Westvaco
Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 48 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. filed Dec. 21, 1979).
7. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1979).
8. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1979). Petition for cert. filed sub. nor. Texas Industries, Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 48
U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. filed Jan. 24, 1980).
9. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 77-2D68 (10th Cir., Nov. 8, 1979),
rehearing en banc granted, Dec. 27, 1979.
10. The Tenth Circuit, however, did leave open the possibility that contribution would
be allowed in the case of an unintentional antitrust violator. Id. at 15.
[Vol. 33:979
ANTITRUST CONTRIBUTION
that the Supreme Court should fashion a rule permitting contribu-
tion among antitrust defendants.
II. CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS IN FEDERAL COURTS
A. Federal Common Law
In Erie v. Tompkins1 the Supreme Court limited the scope of
federal common law to matters governed by the federal constitu-
tion or by federal statute. Application of federal common law, how-
ever, also has been deemed appropriate in those areas that are
"dominated by the sweep of federal statutes"'2 or concerned with
federally created rights. 3 Therefore, the starting point for courts in
determining whether a federal common law rule of contribution ex-
ists is to examine "the statute and the federal policy which it has
adopted."' 4
In Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Railroad Co. 5 the Supreme Court denied indemnity in a negligence
action and set forth the general principle in contribution actions
"that one of several wrongdoers cannot recover against another
wrongdoer .. .. *"' Almost fifty years later, in Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,7 the Court relied upon this
statement and denied contribution for damages stemming from a
noncollision marine accident. The Court observed that "[i]n the
absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction
have generally held that they cannot on their own initiative create
an enforceable right of contribution as between joint tortfeasors."''
These two cases form the basis of the argument that federal com-
mon law bars contribution among joint tortfeasors. 19
A number of federal courts, however, have implied a right of
11. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Prior to Erie, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction ap-
plied rules of "general" federal common law. The Supreme Court abolished this practice,
holding that no general federal common law exists and that state law applies in such cases.
12. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 172, 174 (1942).
13. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1942).
14. 317 U.S. at 176; Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940). See also Wallis v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966). Federal courts are not required to
fashion rules of federal common law. Instead, they may choose to apply state law in the
appropriate case. See 318 U.S. at 367.
15. 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
16. Id. at 224.
17. 342 U.S. 282 (1952). The established marine rule at the time permitted contribu-
tion only in collision cases. The Court declined to extend the rule to allow contribution.
18. 342 U.S. at 285.
19. See DiBenedetto v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-692 (D.R.I. 1974) (contribu-
tion denied under § 6672 of the I.R.C. because "no federal common law right of contribution
exists"); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960)(contribution denied in an
antitrust action because federal common law "with no right of contribution" governs).
1980]
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contribution among joint tortfeasors. A review of these cases indi-
cates that there is no single federal common law rule of contribu-
tion. For example, in George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co."0
the court adopted a rule permitting contribution among tortfeasors
in negligence actions. The court concluded that Union Stock Yards
was not a "fixed and binding federal rule of general application"
because Erie had abolished such rules.2' Thus, the court fashioned
a new rule appropriate to the circumstances by distinguishing be-
tween intentional and unintentional tortfeasors.
This conclusion was reinforced by the Supreme C6urt's limita-
tion of Halcyon in Cooper Stevedoring v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.2 De-
claring that "a 'more equal distribution of justice' can best be
achieved by amelioration of the common-law rule against contribu-
tion," the Court concluded that no countervailing maritime law
considerations detracted from an extention of the maritime contri-
bution rule to noncollision cases.2e
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar decision in an aviation
collision case in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc." Based upon the
federal policy of uniform regulation in aviation matters, the court
concluded that federal common law controlled decisions concerning
the existence of contribution. The court then rejected the tradi-
tional no contribution rule as "outmoded and entirely unsatisfac-
tory" and adopted instead a rule of contribution based upon com-
parative negligence.21
B. Federal Securities Law
The civil liability provisions of the federal securities laws are
designed to deter violations, to encourage institution of private
suits, and to compensate injured plaintiffs.28 Cihil securities suits,
like civil antitrust actions, sound in tort.21 Unlike the antitrust
laws, however, both the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)2s and the
20. 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942). The statutory and decisional law of the District of
Columbia is federal law.
21. Id. at 223.
22. 417 U.S. 106 (1975).
23. Id. at 111.
24. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421.U.S. 978 (1975).
25. 504 F.2d at 404-05.
26. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc, 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); 3 L. Loss, SEcuRmis REGULAToN 1831 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Contribu-
tion Under the Federal Securities Law, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 1256, 1303 (1975).
27. Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1976). Section 77k(f) expressly provides for contribution:
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) of this section shall be
jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes liable, and every person who
[Vol. 33:979
19801 ANTITRUST CONTRIBUTION
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)29 contain express contri-
bution provisions. Moreover, courts have implied a right of contri-
bution in other circumstances." No courts that have permitted
contribution under the securities laws, however, have distinguished
between intentional and unintentional violators.
In deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co. 32 the Colorado District
Court implied a right of contribution under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act. The court reasoned that because the express civil liabil-
ity sections of the 1934 Act provide for contribution, an implied
right of contribution logically follows when civil liability is im-
plied.33 In Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Service, Inc.31 a New York
federal district court expanded the reasoning of deHaas by con-
cluding that barring contribution actually dilutes the deterrent im-
pact of the securities laws by permitting nonpaying defendants to
escape their "liability for compensatory damages by leaving the
whole burden to the more prompt and diligent party."35
Recently, in Heizer Corp. v. Ross,31 the Seventh Circuit rein-
becomes liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribution as in
cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately, would have been liable to
make the same payment, unless the person who has become liable was, and the other
was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-jj (1976). Identical express contribution provisions appear in sub-
sections 78i(e) and r(b), which provide that "[e]very person who becomes liable to make any
payment under this subsection may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any
person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same
payment."
30. See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp 809 (D. Colo. 1968), afl'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (implied private rem-
edy and implied right of contribution under rule 10b-5); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp.
1330 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976) (implied contribution under section
12(2) of the 1933 Act).
31. In other contexts, this distinction has been the controlling factok in determining
whether there is a right of contribution. See notes 11-25 supra and accompanying text.
32. 286 F. Supp 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 435
F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
33. 286 F. Supp. at 815-16. Though no express cause of action exists under rule 10b-5,
it is now generally accepted that an implied right of action does exist. See, e.g., Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
34. 318 F. Supp 955 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam on opinion below, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (Globus ff). In Globus I, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970), plaintiffs recovered a judgment under the 1933 and
1934 Acts. One of three defendants paid the judgment in full and then sought contribution
from the other two in Globus 1.
35. 318 F. Supp. at 958. The court ordered the two nonpaying defendants to reimburse
the moving party on a pro rats basis. Id. See also Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship
Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
For a thorough discussion of the particulars involved in applying contribution, see Note,
supra note 26.
36. 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
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forced this line of cases, holding that an implied right of contribu-
tion exists under rule 10b-5. The court stated that because private
remedies could be implied under the securities laws, contribution
could also be implied to achieve an "equal distribution of jus-
tice." 7 The court buttressed its result by noting the express contri-
bution provisions of the securities laws and by pointing out that
apportioning the loss deters future wrongdoing by all culpable
parties."8
Thus, allowing contribution reinforces the policies underlying
the securities laws. First, the presence of express contfibution pro-
visions is a solid base from which to imply contribution in other
situations. Second, inclusion of such provisions indicates a congres-
sional intent to distribute large damage awards equitably;" imply-
ing contribution when civil liability itself is implied enhances this
congressional policy. Finally, contribution deters future wrongdoing
because no culpable party escapes liability due to a plaintiff's
"whim or spite" in selecting defendants, or because the more dili-
gent party pays the judgment by himself.
C. Federal Antitrust Law
The civil liability provisions of the federal antitrust laws, like
those of the securities laws, are designed to deter violations, to en-
courage the institution of private suits, and to compensate injured
plaintiffs." Prior to the Eighth Circuit's decision41 to allow contri-
bution, however, only two district courts specifically had decided
the issue of contribution among antitrust defendants. In Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 2 after twenty-five de-
fendants had settled with plaintiff, the nonsettling defendants filed
37. Id. at 332. See also notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. Note, supra note 35, at 1258.
40. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977); E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonnie Bell,
Inc., 525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976). Section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), which provides for recovery of treble damages, is designed to
further the goals of deterrence and encouragement of private suits.
41. See notes 50-59 infra and accompanying text.
42. 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Two courts have mentioned the issue in dic-
tum. In Goldlawr Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960), the court stated that if the
complaints were actionable "solely by reason of federal law there would seem to be strong
justification for appellee's contention that the tort asserted to lie in the third party com-
plaint is governed by federal common law with no right of contribution between tort-
feasors." Id. at 616. In Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
the court stated that although defendant was "not presenting a claim for contribution
against its two alleged co-conspirators . . . this antitrust action is governed by federal com-
mon law under which there is no right of contribution for intentional torts." Id. at 678 n.3.
[Vol. 33:979
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a third party suit for contribution and indemnity against several of
the settling defendants. The court granted the third party defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was
no right of contribution among antitrust defendants. Citing the Su-
preme Court decisions in Union Stock Yards and Halcyon Lines,
the court pointed out that federal common law prohibited contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors.43 The court refused to relax this rule
in the antitrust context, reasoning that contribution would thwart
the main goal of antitrust law-deterrence-by diminishing plain-
tiff's control over the action and by influencing his choice to sue.
The court further emphasized that contribution would hamper set-
tlement and would therefore deny plaintiff a prompt recovery." In
addition, the court noted that Congress expressly included contri-
bution in securities statutes but not in antitrust statutes. There-
fore, the court concluded that the issue of contribution in antitrust
cases is a legislative, rather than a judicial, concern. 5
Subsequently, in El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co.," a Cal-
ifornia federal district court held that there was no right of contri-
bution among unintentional violators of antitrust laws. The court
remarked that other federal decisions on contribution were at best
"helpful analogies" and thus not dispositive of the issue. Instead,
the court weighed the countervailing considerations concerning
contribution. In favor of denying contribution, the court noted the
possibilities that Congress intended to exclude contribution, that
plaintiffs would lose control of their lawsuits, and that settlements
would be deterred. Additionally, the court expressed concern that
contribution would further complicate already "enormously com-
plex" antitrust suits." In favor of allowing contribution, the court
cited the existence of contribution in complex securities cases, the
fact that courts could fashion rules protecting the rights of settling
and nonsettling parties, and the notion of fairness to defendants."
Although admitting the persuasiveness of the arguments in favor of
contribution, the court nevertheless concluded that congressional
silence on the issue indicated a conscious policy decision that the
nonavailability of contribution would better serve "the ends of
justice.""
43. The court applied federal common law because the asserted claims were federally
created. 298 F. Supp. at 1343.
44. Id. at 1346.
45. Id. at 1345-46.
46. 1977-1 Trade Cas. T 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
47. Id. at 72,111.
48. Id.
49. Id.
19801
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D. Summary
A review of the relevant decisional law discloses that no single
rule of contribution exists under federal common law. The original
common law rule disallowed contribution altogether. Federal courts
have ameliorated the harshness of this rule, however, by distin-
guishing between intentional and unintentional tortfeasors and by
allowing contribution among the latter.
Antitrust and securities law are alike in that both have been
described as "sounding in tort" and both attempt to*deter viola-
tions, encourage private actions, and compensate injured plaintiffs.
Antitrust and securities law also have another similar characteris-
tic-staggering individual liability. The similarity between anti-
trust and securities law, however, ends when contribution rules are
applied. Under the securities laws, in addition to the express con-
tribution provisions, courts have liberally implied rights of contri-
bution. Antitrust defendants, however, have not met with the same
degree of success and still face the prospect of being forced to pay a
disproportionate share of a judgment. Against this backdrop, three
circuits recently reconsidered the question of contribution among
antitrust defendants.
mH. RECENT RECONSIDERATION OF CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST
DEFENDANTS
A. Contribution Permitted: Professional Beauty Supply
In Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Sup-
ply, Inc.5" the Eighth Circuit reviewed a district court's dismissal of
a third party complaint for contribution and indemnity. Originally,
Professional, a beauty supply wholesaler, sued National, also a
beauty supply wholesaler, alleging an attempt to monopolize in vi-
olation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.51 Professional complained
that National's inducement of LaMaur, Inc., a beauty supply man-
ufacturer, to grant National an exclusive dealership in Minnesota
caused Professional's termination as a LaMaur dealer. National
filed a third party claim for contribution and indemnity against
LaMaur, claiming that LaMaur was the primary wrongdoer. The
50. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). In Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir.
1979), the Seventh Circuit approved in dictum the decision in Professional Beauty Supply.
51. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize,
or.. . combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
[Vol. 33:979
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district court dismissed the third party action for failure to state a
claim. The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed, holding "that under
certain circumstances an antitrust defendant may be entitled to
pro rata contribution from other joint tortfeasors."52
Initially, the court noted that federal law governed the issue of
contribution in antitrust cases. 3 After reviewing the relevant case
law, the court concluded that only Sabre Shipping and El Camino
Glass provided insight into the issue. Noting that Sabre Shipping
relied heavily on Halcyon Lines, the court pointed out that Hal-
cyon had been "seriously eroded" by the Court's decisi n in Cooper
Stevedoring.5 Moreover, the later case demonstrated that even the
Supreme Court was willing to fashion a rule allowing contribution
without express direction from Congress. Thus, the court addressed
five major policy reasons normally thought to prohibit contribu-
tion: first, that Congress intentionally excluded contribution from
the antitrust laws; second, that contribution interferes with a
plaintiff's ability to control his lawsuit; third, that contribution de-
ters settlements; fourth, that contribution increases the complexity
of already complex antitrust suits; and last, that contribution di-
lutes the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. 5
Addressing the issue of congressional intent, the court noted
that the federal antitrust statutes are not comprehensive and that
courts have decided many significant antitrust matters without
congressional direction. Additionally, the court stated that express
provisions for contribution in the securities laws indicated that, if
enacted today, the antitrust laws would likewise provide for contri-
bution. Moreover, the court emphasized that, considering the
sparse case authority relating to contribution in antitrust actions,
congressional action was unlikely on such a complicated issue. Fi-
nally, the court found support for judicial formulation of contribu-
tion rules in other federal cases that had fashioned such rules with-
out express congressional direction.
The court also found that any potential loss of control by
plaintiff of his lawsuit could be avoided by the district court's pru-
dent use of the severance power under the Federal Rules. 6 Deter-
rence of settlements, the court continued, could be avoided through
rules of contribution that protected settling defendants. Concerning
the complexity of antitrust suits, the court reemphasized its belief
52. 594 F.2d at 1182.
53. Id.
54. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
55. 594 F.2d at 1184-85.
56. See FED. R. Crv. P. 20.
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that the power to sever issues and parties would alleviate any
difficulties. Furthermore, the court found this argument against
contribution somewhat specious because contribution is allowed
in complex securities cases without unmanageable administrative
problems.
Finally, the court concluded that the deterrence rationale is an
equally persuasive argument for allowing contribution because it
insures that all violators pay a proportionate share of any award of
damages." The court emphasized that this is especially true when,
as alleged in the instant case, a powerful defendant can economi-
cally influence a plaintiff not to include it as a defendant.
Noting that contribution is an equitable doctrine based on jus-
tice between the parties, the court then asserted "that fairness re-
quires that the right of contribution exist among joint tortfeasors at
least under certain circumstances.""8 The court thus ruled that
even intentional tortfeasors may obtain contribution in antitrust
cases, but held that a specific defendant's right to contribution is a
determination for the trier of fact upon consideration of all the
circumstances. 9
B. Contribution Denied
(1) Abraham Construction
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal of a claim for contri-
bution among antitrust defendants in Wilson P. Abraham Con-
struction Corp. v. Texas Industries, Inc."0 Abraham originally insti-
tuted the action against Texas Industries for an alleged price fixing
scheme designed to raise the price of concrete in violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.6' Abraham also alleged that certain un-
named coconspirators participated in the scheme. Texas Industries,
in turn, filed a third party suit for contribution against the alleged
coconspirators after discovering their identities. The coconspirators
moved to dismiss on the ground that no right of contribution ex-
isted among antitrust defendants. The district court granted the
57. 594 F.2d at 1185.
58. Id.
59. Id. By contrast, the dissent maintained that contribution would hinder, rather
than further, antitrust policy, and that Congress is the appropriate body to decide the issue.
Id. at 1188-90 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
60. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied en banc, 608 F.2d 524 (1979), petition for
cert. filed sub nora. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 3570
(U.S. filed Jan. 24, 1980).
61. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
[Vol. 33:979
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motion, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Initially, the court reasoned that the absence of express contri-
bution provisions in the antitrust laws did not evidence a congres-
sional intent to deny contribution, but instead was simply a narrow
issue not addressed by the drafters. Therefore, the court concluded
that the issue was a matter of federal common law requiring a dis-
crete inquiry into the circumstances of a particular case. Texas In-
dustries advanced five arguments in favor of permitting contribu-
tion: first, that contribution enhances the deterrent effect of the
antitrust laws; second, that it eliminates collusion between plain-
tiff and potential defendants; third, that it is consistent with the
Supreme Court's rejection of in pari delicto as a defense to an anti-
trust action; fourth, that it is consistent with the allowance of con-
tribution under other federal laws; and last, that it is a denial of
due process and equal protection to prohibit contribution. 2 The
court, however, rejected each of these arguments.
The court initially concluded that the very possibility of sole
liability enhances the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws and that
contribution might ameliorate this effect. Thus, because the court
considered the deterrence issue inconclusive, it did not see a com-
pelling reason to fashion a new rule of contribution. On the issue of
collusion, the court reasoned that "[a]lthough the possibility of col-
lusion or coercion has always existed under a no-contribution rule,
the courts and legislatures have not deemed this threat sufficient to
counterbalance the advantages derived from denying contribution
to wrongdoers." 3 Moreover, the court noted that if a defendant es-
tablished such activity, he would have an independent cause of
action.
The court then rejected defendant's in pari delicto rationale
for contribution. Texas Industries had argued that the Supreme
Court's rejection of in pari delicto as a defense to an antitrust ac-
tion"4 meant that contribution should be allowed among equally
culpable defendants. The court, however, stated that Texas Indus-
tries had misinterpreted the Supreme Court's in pari delicto hold-
ing and that the defense still applied in some situations. More im-
portantly, the court failed to discern any correlation between in
pari delicto and contribution. The court reasoned that a rule al-
lowing culpable plaintiffs to file suit strengthened deterrence by in-
creasing the pool of potential private attorneys general. A rule al-
lowing contribution, however, could diminish deterrence by
62. 604 F.2d at 901-05.
63. Id. at 901.
64. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1958).
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permitting defendants to cut their losses. 5
With regard to the trend toward allowing contribution in other
areas of federal law, the court first distinguished the securities de-
cisions by noting the express contribution provisions of the federal
securities laws. The court then distinguished other cases as being
decided either on the basis of state law or without a sufficient
rationale to justify contribution in the antitrust context." The
court then dismissed as without merit the contention that denying
contribution violates a defendant's due process and equal protec-
tion rights. In both contexts the court found a rational ba-
sis-deterrence of violations-to support a no-contribution rule.
The court also rejected the argument that at least uninten-
tional violators should be allowed to seek contribution. First, the
court contended that such a rule might diminish the deterrent
function by decreasing the incentive to avoid questionable conduct.
Second, it reasoned that such a rule might also adversely affect a
plaintiff's control of his case by opening a "Pandora's box" of pro-
cedural problems. 7 Finally, because the court could find no appar-
ent reason for the intent-based distinction except "to ensure equity
in a particular case,"6 it concluded that forging a new contribution
rule with only arguable benefits was a matter best left to Con-
gress." The dissent, in contrast, would have permitted contribution
among unintentional violators. The dissent maintained that deter-
rence is unaffected by allowing contribution and that plaintiffs are
protected by the trial judge's ability to sever parties and issues.
(2) Corrugated Container
In In Re Corrugated Container Litigation7 a Texas federal dis-
trict court disallowed contribution among antitrust defendants.
Shortly after the Abraham Construction decision, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the Texas case in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The
moving defendants have since filed a petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.7 2
65. 604 F.2d at 902-03.
66. Id. at 903.
67. Id. at 906.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 906-08 (Morgan, J., dissenting). The Fifth Circuit, however, subsequently
approved this opinion in In Re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 607 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.
1979).
71. No. 310 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 1979), reprinted in, 919 ANmrUST & TaDE REo. REP.
(BNA) E-1.
72. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., No. 79-972 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. filed Dec. 21, 1979).
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Corrugated Container was a consolidation of several class ac-
tion suits charging a number of defendants with price fixing viola-
tions in the corrugated box industry. When defendants filed their
motion for contribution, twenty-three other defendants represent-
ing approximately eighty percent of the market had already settled
with plaintiff. In reviewing the motion, the district court first noted
that the remaining defendants faced potentially staggering liabil-
ity. The court then weighed this possible unfairness to defendants
against the additional complexity and the possible chilling of set-
tlements that contribution would cause and concluded that contri-
bution was improper and undesirable.3
(3) Olson Farms
In Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores" the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal of an action seeking a declaratory judgment
that Olson Farms was entitled to contribution or indemnity from
defendants. Originally, egg producers filed suit against Olson and
Oakdell Farms alleging a price fixing conspiracy in violation of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.75 Judgment was rendered against
Olson only, and after trebling, fees and interest, it exceeded
$2,400,000.6 The egg producers, however, had claimed $99,656 in
damages against Olson and $745,760 in damages against other un-
named egg buyers. Olson subsequently filed its suit for declaratory
judgment against these buyers. The district court dismissed O1-
son's suit on the ground that no right of contribution existed
among antitrust defendants.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit initially noted the lack of express
contribution provisions in the antitrust laws and then, citing Union
Stock Yards, Halcyon Lines, and Sabre Shipping, concluded that
there is no right of contribution under federal common law.7 In
reaching this conclusion, the court rejected several of Olson's
rationales for a contribution rule. First, Olson argued that under
the Kohr analysis it was an unintentional tortfeasor and thus enti-
tled to contribution. The court, however, disagreed, reasoning that
Olson's acquiescence in the price fixing conspiracy was an inten-
tional violation of the antitrust laws.78 Second, Olson contended
73. 919 ANTrrRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. at h-1.
74. No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979), rehearing en banc granted, Dec. 27, 1979.
75. See notes 51 & 61 supra.
76. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 77-2068, slip op. at 6.
77. Id. at 6-7. See notes 15-18 & 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
78. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 77-2068, slip op. at 8.
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that the federal securities law offered a convincing analogy to anti-
trust actions. The court, however, remarked that the express con-
tribution provisions in securities laws indicated that Congress in-
tended to deny contribution in the antitrust context. 9 Third, Olson
contended that the Supreme Court's rejection of in pari delicto as
an antitrust defense supported a rule of contribution. The court
again disagreed, however, stating that there is no linkage between
the two concepts."0 Finally, Olson argued that the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Professional Beauty Supply supported a finding that
contribution enhanced the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws.
Noting that there were strong arguments on both sides of the deter-
rence rationale,"1 the court concluded that it should await a "clear
signal" from Congress before basing its decision on this factor."
The court, however, did recognize "a possible exception in the case
of an unintentional violator."
The dissent rejected the notion that a defendant found guilty
of an antitrust violation is "a lost soul with no claim on the con-
science of the courts."8 The dissent pointed out that damages
claimed against Olson Farms amounted to $298,968 when trebled.
The original plaintiffs, however, chose to sue the wrongdoer with
the smallest amount of liability, possibly reflecting a conscious de-
cision to sue a less formidable, although financially responsible, de-
fendant. 5 Nevertheless, Olson paid the full amount of liability-in
excess of $2,400,000-and the dissent concluded that denying con-
tribution in such a situation significantly frustrates the deterrent
policy of the antitrust law.86 Finally, the dissent disagreed with the
suggestion that courts should await congressional action, noting
that judicial determination of such an "ancillary" matter was
proper and was supported by the fact that the Sherman Act was
not intended to be comprehensive legislation.'
79. Id. at 8-9.
80. Id. at 9.
81. The court quoted at length from both the majority and minority opinions in Profes.
sional Beauty Supply. Id. at 10-13.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id.
84. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 77-2068, dissenting op. at 5 (Hollo-
way, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 4.
86. Id.
87. Id at 6-7.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Permitting Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants
(1) Compatibility With Antitrust Policy
Although the purported federal comffion law rule disallows
contribution among joint tortfeasors, a review of the case law
proves that adherence to this view is overly strict and most likely
incorrect. Contribution rules range from no contribution to con-
tribution for unintentional torts to contribution without regard
to fault. Moreover, the strict rule ignores the policies underlying
individual federal statutes. Although the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
correctly perceived this problem, only the latter decided that con-
tribution should be allowed among antitrust defendants.
Although antitrust law and policy is the basis for deciding the
contribution issue, the securities laws provide an appropriate anal-
ogy. The underlying policies of civil liability and the potential size
and complexity of lawsuits are similar in the securities and anti-
trust contexts. Furthermore, contribution has existed in securities
law for a number of years; thus, its effect on securities law policy is
readily ascertainable. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits nevertheless
rejected the securities law analogy due to the express contribution
provisions in the securities statutes. Although the express provi-
sions are a significant difference, they do not destroy the basis of
the analogy-that both statutory schemes are designed to deter vi-
olations and encourage private actions. If contribution, whether ex-
press or implied, fosters these purposes in the securities context,
then it should foster similar goals in the antitrust context.
Upon close examination, the arguments against allowing con-
tribution prove unpersuasive. For example, it is claimed that con-
tribution dilutes the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. As noted
above, however, it is difficult to understand how contribution en-
hances the deterrent effect of the securities laws," but dilutes the
deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. The fact that contribution
has been implied in the securities context for over ten years is per-
suasive evidence that contribution does not diminish deterrence.
Moreover, this argument fails to take into account the deterrent
effect of treble damages and criminal liability. It seems unlikely
that a defendant would risk treble his proportionate share of dam-
ages and possible criminal sanctions simply because he did not face
the prospect of shouldering the entire amount of liability alone.
Furthermore, as one commentator has suggested, it would be diffi-
88. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
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cult for a business manager to understand exactly the degree of his
involvement and potential liability at the inception of an antitrust
violation.89
It also has been argued that contribution will complicate anti-
trust suits to such a point that potential plaintiffs may forego a
legitimate cause of action. The power of the district courts to sever
issues and parties, however, provides plaintiffs with adequate pro-
tection. In addition, application of contribution rules in complex
securities cases has not resulted in unmanageable problems. Fi-
nally, this argument fails to take into account the great incentive
to sue under treble damage statutes.
With regard to the contention that allowing contribution de-
ters settlements, rules can be fashioned to protect the settling par-
ties. Two recent proposals-one by Congress9' and one by the
American Bar Association's Antitrust Section'-offer such protec-
tion by releasing settling defendants from contribution.
Thus, contribution can be implemented with little or no seri-
ous erosion of antitrust law policy. The mere absence of negative
factors, however, is not enough to justify contribution. A rule of
contribution in antitrust suits must also be prompted by positive
factors in order to tip the scales in favor of change.
(2) Equity and Antitrust Defendants
Contribution is an equitable concept based on the notion that
parties jointly responsible for harm should share the burden of lia-
bility. Equity requires that the right to contribution be afforded to
89. Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. Rav. 682 (1978).
90. In Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
there were forty-four separate defendants with varying claims for contribution. Defendants
agreed to withhold their claims until the original claim was decided.
91. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (The Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of
1979). The bill proposes to amend the Clayton Act to permit contribution in price fixing
cases. Section 41(c) provides that settlement "relieves the recipient from liability to any
other person for contribution, with respect to the claim of the person giving the release or
covenant, or agreement." Id. § 41(c). In addition, the bill provides protection for nonsettling
defendants by requiring the court to reduce the claim of plaintiff by "(1) any amdunt stipu-
lated by the release or covenant, (2) the amount of consideration paid for it [the settlement],
or (3) treble the actual damages attributable to the settling person's sales or purchases of
goods or services" whichever is greatest. Id.
92. ABA, ANwrmusT SEcTION, Resolution and Report of the Section of Antitrust Law of
the American Bar Association On Proposed Amendment of the Clayton Act To Permit Con-
tribution in Damage Actions Brought Thereunder (Sept. 6, 1979), reprinted in 936 ANTrrRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (Oct. 25, 1979). Section (e) provides that "[c]ontribution may
not be obtained in favor of or against a person who, pursuant to a settlement agreement with
plaintiff in the action in respect of which contribution rights are claimed, has been released
from potential liability." Id. § (e).
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antitrust defendants. First, lack of contribution opens the possibil-
ity of collusion between plaintiffs and wrongdoers not named as de-
fendants. For example, in Professional Beauty Supply a more pow-
erful company allegedly pressured plaintiff into not naming it as a
defendant in return for a continued and vital business relationship.
The obvious inequity is that a less powerful and perhaps less guilty
party is forced to shoulder the entire burden of liability. Contribu-
tion avoids this inequity by eliminating the possibility that a
wrongdoer can escape liability when a plaintiff overlooks him as a
defendant.
Second, contribution eliminates coercive or "whipsaw" settle-
ments in large cases. For example, in In Re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation" defendants had little or no choice but to set-
tle, even if they were innocent of wrongdoing, because of the poten-
tially staggering liability. As each defendant settled, the potential
liability of those remaining increased by the defendant's share mi-
nus the settlement value only." In view of the prevalence of large
damage actions, plaintiffs increasingly may use this technique to
coerce unfair settlement arrangements. The obvious inequity of
such coercive potential renders inappropriate one of the more com-
mon justifications for denying contribution-that its absence "fa-
cilitates" settlement and thereby keeps antitrust litigation man-
ageable. Indeed, the Supreme Court in United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co. admonished that "congestion in the courts cannot jus-
tify a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply to
encourage speedy out-of-court accommodations.' 5
Finally, contribution prevents a plaintiff from proceeding only
against less formidable but still financially responsible defendants.
Such a defendant should not be forced to shoulder the entire bur-
den due to a plaintiff's convenience, whim, or strategy. The notion
that an intentional tortfeasor is a "bad man" is nothing more than
"misplaced prudery."" Instead, intentional violators of antitrust
laws should be accorded the same treatment given to intentional
violators of securities laws. Because contribution would treat anti-
trust defendants fairly without impairing the underlying policies of
antitrust laws, it should be allowed.
93. See In Re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, No. 310 (S.D. Tex. May 30,
1979), reprinted in 919 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1.
94. See Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 533-35 (3d Cir. 1976);
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957);
Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 12 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
95. 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975).
96. Gregory, supra note 3.
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B. Judicial Implementation of Contribution
All three circuit courts that recently reconsidered the anti-
trust-contribution issue addressed the" question whether contribu-
tion should be implemented by Congress or the courts. There are
two aspects to this issue. First, does the omission by Congress of
contribution provisions from the antitrust laws mean that Congress
established a no-contribution rule that only it can change, and, if
not, is the decision to permit contribution more appropriately a
legislative or judicial matter.
Concerning the first question, Congress probably did not con-
sider the contribution issue. The Tenth Circuit contended that the
presence of such provisions in the securities laws supports a conclu-
sion that Congress intended to omit contribution from the antitrust
laws. The more likely conclusion, however, is that the omission is a
reflection of the different eras and the different circumstances
under which the two bills were drafted. The original securities
laws, enacted in 1933 and 1934, were patterned after the British
Companies Acts, which included express contribution provisions."
These provisions represented a growing British dissatisfaction with
the no-contribution rule that ultimately resulted in its statutory
abolition." The express provisions in the securities laws resulted
from similar dissatisfaction in the United States and from a con-
gressional expectation of multiple defendants in a single suit." The
antitrust laws, however, originally were enacted in 1890 and 1914, a
period during which there was little controversy over the no-contri-
bution rule. 0 Moreover, at the time, it was not expected that,
many private suits would be instituted under the civil liability sec-
tions."' Instead, the debates focused primarily on the constitution-
ality of the scheme and on the types of activities to be regulated.0 2
97. Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23 (1929). These acts provided for contri-
bution "as in cases of contract."
98. Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30 §
6 (1935).
99. L. Loss, supra note 26, at 1737, 1738-39 n.178 (2d ed. 1961).
100. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 1,
§ 50 at 305-06.
101. During the debates on the Sherman Act, Senator George of Mississippi in refer-
ring to private antitrust actions stated that "few, if any, of such suits will ever be instituted,
and not one will ever be successful." 21 CONG. Rc. 1768, reprinted in BILLS AND DEBATES
RELATING TO TRUSTS 50TH-57TH CONGRESS, S. Doc. No. 147, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1903)
[hereinafter BILS AND DEBATES]. Senator Sherman agreed stating "[v]ery few actions will
probably be brought [under the private action section] . . . ." Id. at 2569, BILLS AND DEBATES
at 166. Similar views were expressed during the debates on the Clayton Act. See 51 CONG.
REc. 13853 (1914)(remarks of Senator Chilton).
102. See 1 H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAws OF THE UNrTED STATES 1-23
(1949); 2 H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRusT LAws OF THE UNITED STATES 1-11 (1949).
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Thus, the issue was probably never considered by the drafters. °3
Once it is resolved that Congress did not intend to preclude
contribution in antitrust cases, the question remains whether con-
tribution is more appropriately a legislative or judicial matter.
There are a number of reasons why the courts should decide this
issue. First, contribution is a judicially created doctrine developed
to ameliorate the inequitable treatment of those jointly liable for
damages, and its rationale has not been altered by its adoption in
common law.114 Thus, because contribution is a judicial remedy
procedural in nature, it falls within the judicial sphere.
Second, as stated in Professional Beauty Supply, the antitrust
laws were not intended to be comprehensive, and "[t]he legislative
history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts
to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on com-
mon-law tradition."105 In this regard, courts have dealt with many
questions left unanswered by the antitrust laws, and contribution
is merely another ancillary matter requiring supplementation by
judicial decision.
Finally, the need for an immediate remedy to existing inequi-
ties militates toward prompt judicial action. Because there is no
bar to judicial resolution of this issue, the recent split among the
circuits provides the Supreme Court the opportunity to remedy the
inequities created by the no-contribution rule. Although Congress
103. A review of the legislative history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts reveals an
absence of discussion on the contribution issue. See BIS AND DEBATES, supra note 101, at 1-
479; 51 CONG. Rac. 6714, 8201, 8200, 9068-91, 9153-90, 9195-202, 9245-73, 9388-418, 9466-96,
9538-611, 9652-82, 9909-11, 13319, 13633, 13658-70, 13844-59, 13897-902, 13906-25, 13963-83,
14010-42, 14087-100, 14124, 14200-29, 14249-76, 14312-34, 14363-78, 14412, 14413-21, 14451-
79, 14513-46, 14585-610, 15588-89, 15637, 15663-64, 15789, 15790-93, 15818-31, 15854-68,
15834-58, 15983-6008, 16042-68, 16105-18, 16142-70, 16212-13, 16264-84, 16317-44 (1914). Fur-
ther the history of the major amendments to the Acts do not reveal discussions on the contri-
bution issue. The Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973), amended section 1 of the Sher-
man Act by legalizing price maintenance contracts in some situations. It did not address the
issue of civil damages. See 1 H. TOULMNN, supra note 102, at 232-38. The Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1973), amended the price discrimination sections of the Clayton Act,
and a review of its legislative history shows an absence of discussion on contribution. See W.
PATMAN, A COMPLETE GUIDE To THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT app. c (2d ed. 1963). The Act of
July 7, 1955, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-3 (1976) simply amended sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman
Act to increase criminal penalties from $5,000 to $50,000-contribution was not at issue. See
[1955] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2322-25. Finally, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976), amended the Clayton Act
to permit State attorneys general to recover on behalf of state residents for injuries caused
by antitrust violations. Although the legislative history reveals discussion on large damages,
contribution was not mentioned. See [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2572-648.
104. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 170 (D. Del. 1974), va-
cated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Jones v. Schramm, 436 F.2d 899, 901
(1970); 18 Am. JUR. 2d Contribution 99 4-5 (1965).
105. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
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has shown some interest in this subject,1 01 the legislative process
can be slow and unproductive. Thus, the judiciary remains the
more appropriate body to resolve the contribution issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The potential of staggering liability in several recent cases has
led three federal circuits to reconsider the rule barring contribution
among antitrust defendants. As demonstrated above, courts reex-
amining this question must begin with the antitrust laws and their
underlying policy rather than apply a single federal rule. Because
the securities laws have similar purposes and also involve large,
complex suits, resolution of the contribution question under these
statutes provides an apt analogy for judicial treatment in the anti-
trust context.
The experience of courts allowing contribution in the securities
context indicates that contribution would not threaten the anti-
trust policies of deterring violations, encouraging private actions,
and compensating injured parties. Indeed, the existence of treble
damages and criminal penalties in the antitrust context virtually
assures that these goals will be effected. Finally, a court's ability to
sever parties and issues and to fashion rules protecting settling par-
ties should adequately deal with the potential problems of com-
plexity and settlement.
Most importantly, contribution would eliminate the substan-
tial inequities facing defendants in large damage actions. Specifi-
cally, it would diminish the opportunity for collusion between pow-
erful potential defendants and plaintiffs that rely on them for
continued business. Contribution would also help eliminate coer-
cive settlements in these large actions. Finally, it would decrease
the chance that an individual defendant will be forced to bear the
entire burden of liability merely because the plaintiff, by whim or
strategy, has singled out that defendant.
Because contribution is an equitable remedy, created and tra-
ditionally administered by the courts, the courts are in the best
position to make the flexible determination whether the equities of
a case require that contribution be allowed. Congress' omission of
contribution from the antitrust statutes was not intended as a deci-
sion to bar contribution. Rather, it was more likely never consid-
ered. Thus, the courts need not defer to this illusory legislative
judgment, but instead should seize the opportunity to permit con-
tribution when equity requires.
JANE GETKER PARKS
106. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
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